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I.

Introduction

What is a “minor impairment?” Over the last decade, courts have had serious contention
over how to analyze the term in the employment discrimination context. To be regarded as
having a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), an impairment must not
be “transitory and minor.”1 While the ADA explicitly defines transitory, it does not define
minor.2 Without an exact definition from Congress in the ADA, the United States Courts of
Appeals have been divided on how to interpret the term. The confusion among the courts has led
to decisions that have left employees without recourse for their injuries and for adverse
employment actions based on their disabilities.
With this confusion, decisions like Randall v. United Petroleum Transports, Inc. have
prevailed throughout the country.3 In Randall, an employee suffered a seizure disorder. His
employer concluded that he would be unable to drive for six months.4 When he sued for being
regarded as being disabled during this period, the court denied his claim since it held his
impairment was transitory, so he was not regarded as disabled.5 There was no discussion of
whether the impairment could be minor, or if that was important. 6 Had the court required the
perceived impairment to also be minor to be outside the protection of the statute, a different
decision might well have been rendered. More stringent standards for courts to follow when
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1 42 U.S.C § 12102 (3) (2018).
2 See id.
3 131 F. Supp. 3d 566 (W. D. La. 2015).
4 Id. at 572.
5 Id.
6 See id.
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discussing the transitory and minor exception could help lead to fewer decisions like Randall,
where employees are unfairly treated due to their short-term impairments.
The goal of the ADA is to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”7 Signed into law by
President George H. W. Bush in 1990,8 the ADA has been described as the most influential
federal civil rights legislation enacted since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9 The Act “guarantees
that people with disabilities have the same opportunities as everyone else to participate in the
mainstream of American life—to enjoy employment opportunities, to purchase goods and
services, and to participate in State and local government programs and services.”10 The ADA
consists of five titles, and Title I, the employment title, covers employers with fifteen or more
employees.11 To be protected under the ADA, the individual must have a disability. 12
Individuals are disabled when they have an impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities, a history of having such an impairment, or are regarded as having an
impairment.13
This Comment will focus on the third prong of disability: a person who is regarded as
having an impairment. More specifically, this Comment will focus on: the transitory and minor
exception to being regarded as being disabled. Since it was added to the ADA in the Americans
Against Disability Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), there have been concerns there will
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42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
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be significant confusion over the transitory and minor exception’s analysis, and the concerns
have persisted.14
This Comment calls for courts to interpret the ADAAA and the transitory and minor
exception in three specific ways. First, the transitory and minor exception should be an
affirmative defense brought by the employer who has the burden of proof. Second, courts should
analyze transitory separately from minor. Third, minor should be defined using a commonsense
standard that will be described fully later in this comment.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of the ADAAA and the transitory and
minor exception. It will also discuss the circuit split on the exception, and the four standards
courts use. Part III will discuss Eshleman v. Patrick Industries,15 a recent and seminal case in
employment discrimination, and the court’s analysis of transitory and minor. It will also
elaborate on the Third Circuit’s recent approach for which party should hold the burden of proof
for the exception and the analysis of transitory and minor. Part IV will argue why the exception
should be an affirmative defense brought by the employer, and why transitory should be
analyzed separately from minor. It will discuss how this can be found in a direct reading of the
ADA, its amendments, and other regulations. Part V will pose a working definition of “minor”
the courts can use. The section will discuss various definitions of the word minor from a variety
of fields and how it should be best interpreted by the courts. Part VI will briefly conclude.
II.
A.

The History and Interpretation of the ADAAA’s Transitory and Minor Exception
ADA Title I: What is a Disability?

See Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the
“Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disab ility, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1028 (“What is clear is that
the ‘minor’ impairment exclusion will generate considerable uncertainly and litigation”).
15 961 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2020).
14
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The ADA was passed in 1990 with overwhelming support in both houses of Congress. 16
Congress intended to protect individuals with disabilities.17 The Act protects a narrowly defined
group of individuals, similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.18
The ADA divides the definition of a disability into three separate prongs.19 The first
prong is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual.”20 The second prong is “a record of such an impairment.”21 The
third prong, and the main focus of this Comment, is “being regarded as having such an
impairment.”22 Under the ADA as amended, an individual meets the third prong if the individual
“establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because
of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or
is perceived to limit a major life activity.”23 This section, however, explicitly excludes
impairments that are “transitory and minor.”24 The Act defines a transitory impairment as an
impairment with an “actual or expected duration of six months or less.” 25 The Act does not,
however, define the word “minor.”26 Overall, the statute requires that the definition of disability
should be construed as broadly as possible and to the maximum extent allowed by the Act. 27
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Porter, supra note 11, at 386.
Id.
18 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits “discrimination against any individual . . . because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”. 42 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1). The ADA “provides a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. §12101.
19 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
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performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” The ADA also defines the operations of
major bodily functions, which included “functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel,
bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”
21 Id. § 12102(1)(B).
22 Id. § 12102(1)(C).
23 Id. § 12102(3).
24 Id.
25 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
26 See id.
27 Id. § 12102 (4). In the original draft of the ADA, the Act considered an impairment a disability provided the
disability included “being regarded as having such an impairment,” if the impairment substantially limited a major
life activity. Effectively, it combined the first and third factors, but this was changed in 2009 to the current language
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B.

The ADAAA and its Purpose
When the ADA was enacted, there was general optimism from legislators and activists

alike the Act would be effective in providing a “national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”28 Within the third “regarded as” prong of
disabilities, Congress hoped the statute would “curb ‘society’s accumulated myths and fears
about disability.’”29 Unfortunately, this did not pan out as planned, as several Supreme Court
cases significantly narrowed the class of protected “disabled employees” beginning in 1999. 30
The most significant of these cases was Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. in which the Court held a
plaintiff is not protected by virtue of being regarded as disabled unless the employer perceives
the plaintiff’s impairment as one that would substantially limit a major life activity.31 It also held
mitigating measures, such as medication and prosthetic devices, should be taken into account in
determining whether a person is disabled for purposes of the ADA. 32 These narrow holdings by
the Court made it more difficult for plaintiffs to make claims under the original ADA, and posed
a “serious obstacle” to eliminate discrimination of individuals with disabilities. 33 In response to
the Supreme Court, Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 to expand the reach of
the statute’s prohibitions.34
The goal of the ADAAA was to make it easier for an individual seeking protection under
the ADA to establish he or she had a disability within the meaning of the statute. 35 With the
enactment of the ADAAA, Congress overturned several Supreme Court decisions, including

described above. Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis, An Americans with Disabilities Act for Everyone, and for the
Ages as Well, 39 CARDOZO L. REV 669, 678 (2017).
28 Befort, supra note 14, at 993.
29 Id. (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)).
30 Id. at 993–94.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Befort, supra note 14, at 993.
35 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 § 2.
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Sutton, that Congress believed too narrowly interpreted the definition of disability.36 The
Amendments stated disability should be read in favor of broad coverage for individuals. 37 The
ADAAA furthered Congress’s intent to give a workable standard by “adopting ‘rules of
construction’ to use when determining if an individual is substantially limited in performing a
major life activity.”38 These rules of construction came directly from the statute.39
First, Congress stated the term “substantially limits” from the first prong of disabilities
requires a lower standard of functional limitation than the degree applied by the courts in the
past.40 The impairment is not required to fully prevent or even significantly restrict a major life
activity to be substantially limiting, however not every impairment constitutes a disability. 41 It
also stated an impairment that is episodic or in remission could also be “substantially limiting” if
it substantially limits a major life activity when active. 42 Overall, the statute required that the
standard be construed broadly for maximum coverage allowable by the ADA. 43
The ADAAA also required a path to “make it easier” for individuals to establish coverage
under the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability.44 The ADAAA redefined the focus
to “how a person has been treated because of a physical or mental impairment (that is not
transitory and minor), rather than what an employer may have believed about the nature of the
person's impairment.”45 However, employers are not required to accommodate employees who
are only regarded as having a disability.46
Fact Sheet on the EEOC's Final Regulations Implementing the ADAAA, EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N &
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE . [hereinafter EEOC Fact Sheet],
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/fact-sheet-eeocs-final-regulations-implementing-adaaa (last updated May 3,
2011).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 EEOC Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.; ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 § 2.
46 See EEOC Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
36
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C.

EEOC Interpretations of the Transitory and Minor Exception
Due to the concerns over how the transitory and minor exception was being

inconsistently implemented and decided by the courts, the EEOC took an official position in
September 2009 when it proposed several rules on how to interpret the ADA following the
passage of the ADAAA.47 The EEOC regulations were codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations after public comment.48 In the regulations, the EEOC stated the “transitory and
minor” exception must be argued as an affirmative defense. 49
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination by an individual
claiming coverage under the “regarded as” prong of the definition
of disability that the impairment is (in the case of an actual
impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment)
“transitory and minor.” To establish this defense, a covered entity
must demonstrate that the impairment is both “transitory” and
“minor.” Whether the impairment at issue is or would be
“transitory and minor” is to be determined objectively. A covered
entity may not defeat “regarded as” coverage of an individual
simply by demonstrating that it subjectively believed the
impairment was transitory and minor; rather, the covered entity
must demonstrate that the impairment is (in the case of an actual
impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment)
both transitory and minor.50
In the Appendix of the Federal Regulations, the EEOC included a few examples as to
how the transitory and minor exception should be applied.51 The first requirement was that the
determination of “transitory and minor” must be made objectively. 52 In the first example, an
individual who is denied a promotion due to a minor back injury would be “regarded as” having
a disability if the back injury lasted or was expected to last six months or more. 53 Even though

47

Gordon Good, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Short-Term Disabilities, Exceptions, and the
Meaning of Minor, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 99, 111 (2011).
48 Id. at 111 n.91.
49 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2011)
50 Id. (emphasis added).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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the injury was minor, since it was not transitory it would not meet the exception. 54 On the other
hand, if an employer discriminated against an employee based on the employee’s bipolar
disorder, which the EEOC states is not transitory and minor, the employee is “regarded as” being
disabled even if the employer subjectively believes the disorder is transitory and minor. 55 As a
general rule, the EEOC requires that “regarded as” disability claims should be construed broadly,
but the “transitory and minor” exception should be construed narrowly.56
D.

Congress’s Interpretation of the ADA, the ADAAA and the Transitory and Minor

Exception
When Congress originally wrote the ADA, the goal was to make it a less challenging
standard for employees to receive protection under the law. In fact, Congress “did not expect or
intend that this would be a difficult standard to meet.” 57 During the deliberations of the
ADAAA, the House Committee on Education and Labor explicitly rejected Sutton and instead
stated the fact that an individual was discriminated against due to a perceived or actual
impairment would be sufficient to claim a disability. 58
Regarding the “transitory and minor” exception, the Committee stated the exception was
necessary because individuals seeking coverage under the “regarded as” prong d id not need to
meet the “functional limitation requirement” of the first two prongs. 59 Without this exception,
the “regarded as” prong could cover individuals “who are regarded as having common ailments
like the cold or flu.”60 The inclusion of the exception was created to prevent “potential abuse of
the Act” and misapplication of resources to individuals with “minor ailments that last only a

54

Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2011).
56 Kevin Barry, Brian East & Marcy Karin, Pleading Disability after the ADAAA, 31 H OFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1,
21 (2013).
57 H.R. Rep. No. 110–730 pt. 2, at 13 (2008).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
55
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short period of time.”61 The Committee decided the exception for coverage should be construed
narrowly as an exception to the general rule for broad coverage of “regarded as” impairments. 62
E.

Circuit Courts’ Split Interpretations of the “Transitory and Minor” Exception
Even with the EEOC’s and Congress’s guidelines for interpretation, courts are split as to

how to interpret the “transitory and minor” exception. The courts are divided over whether the
employer or employee must prove the “transitory and minor” exception, and how transitory and
minor should be evaluated. There are four main approaches the courts have followed in
discussing “transitory and minor.” The first, discussed in Part 1 of this section, is that the
employer must bring the affirmative defense of “transitory and minor” and has the burden of
proof. The second, discussed in Part 2 below, is that the employee has the burden of proof of
proving the impairment is not transitory and minor. The third, discussed in Part 3, is when a
court implicitly holds an impairment is minor because it is transitory. The fourth, discussed in
Part 4, requires evaluating transitory and minor separately.
1.

Employer Needs to Prove the Defense

In the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the courts have held the employer is required to
bring forward the affirmative defense of transitory and minor and thus has the burden of proof.63
The Seventh Circuit discussed this approach first in 2015 in Silk v. Board of Trustees, Moriane
Valley Cmty. Coll., Dist. No. 524.64 The plaintiff in Silk was an adjunct professor at Moraine
Valley Community College who underwent heart surgery and went on medical leave. 65 The
professor did not give any notification when he would return, and about a month later the

61

Id.
Id.
63 Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2019); Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 908
F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2018); Silk v. Board of Trustees, Moriane Valley Cmty. Coll., Dist. No. 524, 795 F.3d 698 (7th
Cir. 2015).
64 795 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2015).
65 Id. at 701–02.
62
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College told the professor it would need a doctor’s medical release when he returned. 66 He sent
back his release and requested to take on a full course load upon his return.67 After monitoring
him on a smaller class load, the College claimed his teaching methods were poor and terminated
him.68
The Seventh Circuit held that, to defeat the plaintiff’s claim that he was eligible for
protection as regarded as disabled, the College is required to argue the plaintiff’s injury was both
transitory and minor to “head [plaintiff] off at the pass.” 69 The Court held the standard is an
objective one where the College must prove Silk’s injury was actually transitory and minor. 70
The College had the burden of proof to show that the injury was transitory and minor, and the
court held that it failed to do so.71 The court cited to the Code of Federal Regulations to hold
that the College must prove the injury was transitory and minor, and may not just “subjectively
believe[]” it.72 The court stated that the College had not given any evidence for how long the
impairment would last, so it had not established that the heart condition was transitory or
minor.73
The Ninth Circuit also held the exception to be an affirmative defense.74 A delivery
driver with a shoulder injury was ultimately fired after he requested a “part-time, less-physical
warehouse job” in the company.75 The employee was told he had in effect resigned, but he had
documentation from a doctor of his injury and inability to work for a short period of time.76 The
company argued that the burden was on the driver to show his impairment was not transitory or

66

Id. at 702–03.
Id. at 703.
68 Id. at 703–04.
69 Silk, 795 F.3d at 706.
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 908 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2018).
75 Id. at 428–31.
76 Id. at 431–32.
67
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minor in order to be covered by the ADA, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed.77 The court followed
the EEOC’s guidance and held the “‘transitory and minor’ exception is an affirmative defense,
and ‘[a]s such, the employer bears the burden of establishing the defense.’” 78 Since the
employer did not offer any evidence to show that the injury was transitory and minor, the court
stated it did not need to offer any additional analysis on the exception.79
The Sixth Circuit held an employer can rebut a prima facie case of “regarded as”
disability with proof that the impairment is transitory and minor.80 The plaintiff-employee was a
certified registered nurse anesthesiologist with a degenerative retinal condition that made it
difficult for her to read screens from a distance. 81 The employee was fired and made a claim that
she was regarded as being disabled.82 The court held the employer had the burden to show
evidence that the impairment was transitory and minor to defeat ADA coverage.83
2.

Employee Needs to Rebut the Exception

Unlike the courts in the first category, some circuits courts have put the burden of proof
on the plaintiff to show the impairment was not transitory and minor. In the Tenth Circuit, the
court used that standard in Adair v. City of Muskogee.84 In the case, the plaintiff was a firefighter
who injured his back during a training exercise. 85 He attempted to come back to work, but the
department required him to get a medical evaluation. 86 The doctors said he was unfit to work as
a firefighter again, and the department required him to either retire or be terminated .87 The
court’s reading of the ADAAA required the plaintiff to show “(1) he has an actual or perceived

77

Id. at 435.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(l)).
79 See id.
80 Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2019).
81 Id. at 311.
82 Id. at 314.
83 Id. at 319–21.
84 823 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2016).
85 Id. at 1301.
86 Id.
87 Id.
78
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impairment, (2) that impairment is neither transitory nor minor, and (3) the employer was aware
of and therefore perceived the impairment at the time of the alleged discriminatory action.”88
Therefore, the court in dicta required a “regarded as” plaintiff to give proof the impairment was
neither transitory nor minor.89 Ultimately, the court stated it was irrelevant in this case as the
plaintiff’s injury was so serious that he could no longer be a firefighter, so he was not a qualified
individual that could bring a regarded-as claim.90
As described in more detail later, the Third Circuit in Eshleman v. Patrick Industries also
required the plaintiff to carry the burden of persuasion that the impairment is not transitory and
minor.91
3.

Implying Minor from Transitory

In the next category of cases discussing the transitory and minor exception are decisions
in which the court implicitly held that the impairment was minor because the impairment was
transitory, without any other discussion of minor. In White v. Interstate Distribution Company,
the Sixth Circuit held that since the plaintiff’s injuries lasted less than six months, they were
objectively transitory and, thus, minor.92 The plaintiff, White, was a maintenance truck and
trailer tech for Interstate Distribution Company. 93 Plaintiff was injured outside of work and
requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. 94 His doctor recommended one to two
months of temporary work restrictions, but his boss told him there were no positions available to
him under those restrictions.95 The court rejected plaintiff’s “regarded as” disability claim, since
“the ADA explicitly states that the ‘regarded as’ definition ‘shall not apply to impairments that
88

Id.
Id. at 1306.
90 Adair, 823 F.3d at 1306.
91 See Part III.A.1 for further discussion.
92 43 Fed. Appx. 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2011).
93 Id. at 417.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 417–18.
89
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are transitory and minor.”96 The court stated that a transitory impairment is an impairment with
an actual or expected duration of six months or less.97 There was no dispute between the parties
that White's impairments were transitory, as his doctor expected his restrictions to be in effect for
only a month or two.”98 Because the injuries only lasted two months at most, the court held that
White’s argument failed as a matter of law, ignoring any other analysis of minor.99
The Fifth Circuit also found an impairment was “transitory and minor” because the injury
lasted less than six months in Lyons v. Katy Independent School District.100 Lyons was a teacher
and coach of three sports for Katy Independent School District. 101 During the summer of 2014,
she underwent lap band surgery.102 Because of the surgery, she informed her principal that she
was unable to attend the summer sports camps. 103 She was then demoted from her position and
taken off the coaching staff of two sports.104
The court held the injury was objectively transitory and minor because “the actual or
expected duration of any impairment related to the lap band procedure was less than six
months. . . . There are no facts in dispute regarding the transitory and minor nature of the
perceived impairment.”105
Prior to Eshleman, the Third Circuit also considered the transitory and minor exception in
Budhun v. Reading Hospital and Medical Center.106 Budhun was a typing secretary107 who
broke her fifth metacarpal (pinky finger) outside of work and went to work later that day with

96

Id. at 420.
Id.
98 White, 43 F. Appx. at 420.
99 See id.
100 964 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2020).
101 Id. at 300.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 303.
106 765 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2014).
107 Id. at 248.
97

14

her hand in a metal splint.108 She had met with her doctor who taped three of her fingers
together.109 Plaintiff informed her employer that, even though she had a splint on her hand, she
could still work—albeit not as fast as she used to.110 Her employer disagreed that she could
work unrestricted: if you “were truly unrestricted in your abilities, you would have full use of all
your digits;” she was fired upon her return to work.111 Budhun sued, claiming she was regarded
as having a disability, but the court rejected the claim, holding it is “abundantly clear that [her
employer] considered Budhun to have a broken bone in her hand and nothing more.”112 The
court held a “regarded as” claim would not lie if “the impairment is ‘transitory and minor,’
which means it has an ‘actual or expected duration of six months or less.’” 113 Budhun conceded
as much because she described her injury as “temporary.”114 Since she specifically conceded her
injury prevented her from using three fingers for approximately two months, the court held the
plaintiff’s injury was objectively transitory and minor.115
III.

The Eshleman v. Patrick Industries Decision and the Transitory and Minor Analysis
Eshleman v. Patrick Industries is an example of a robust analysis by a circuit court of the

transitory and minor exception. William Eshleman was a truck driver for Patrick Industries
beginning in July 2013, and went on medical leave from October 14, 2015 through December 14,
2015 to have surgery to remove a nodule from his left lung. 116 Prior to taking leave, he let his
supervisor know he would be taking leave and getting tested for cancer.117 After the two month
leave, he returned to work at full capacity without restrictions. 118 Six weeks later, he had a

108

Id.
Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Budhun, 765 F.3d at 259.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., 961 F.3d 244, 244 (3d Cir. 2020).
117 Id.
118 Id.
109
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severe respiratory infection that lasted four days, and he obtained supervisor approval to use
vacation days during that time off.119 He returned to work at full capacity right afterwards, but
was fired at the end of the next day.120 The Superintendent first informed him that his
termination was due to “performance issues,” but Eshleman claimed he had excellent reviews
from the month before.121 Later, the company announced the termination was because he did not
call out sick.122 Even later, Patrick Industries asserted it terminated him for “behavioral
issues.”123 Eshleman contended Patrick Industries regarded him as disabled and violated the
ADAAA by firing him because of the time he took off for his biopsy and sickness.124
The District Court conceded Eshleman had sufficiently pled a “regarded as” disability
case125 but he had failed to allege his perceived impairment was not “transitory and minor.”126
The court stated an affirmative defense to an ADA claim “may be raised if it is apparent on the
face of the complaint the impairment, or perceived impairment, is ‘transitory and minor’—
meaning it has an actual or expected duration of six months or less.” 127 The court further stated
Eshleman acknowledged his first medical leave lasted only eight weeks and his second leave
lasted four days.128 Then, Eshleman was cleared to work with no restrictions.129 The court held
that because the actual or expected duration of Mr. Eshleman’s impairment lasted less than six
months, it was a transitory and minor injury.130
A.

Reasoning by the Third Circuit

119

Id.
Id.
121 Id. at 244–45.
122 Eshleman, 961 F.3d at 244–45.
123 Id. at 244.
124 Id.
125 Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., No. 17-4427, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24082, at *3 (3rd Cir. Feb. 14, 2019).
126 Id. at *6.
127 Id. at *7.
128 Id. at *4.
129 Id.
130 Id. at *9–10.
120

16

1.

Reasoning about the Pleading Standard

This procedural posture at the Third Circuit was review of the grant of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.131 On appeal, the court was solely addressing whether
“Eshleman’s complaint sufficiently allege[d] a regarded-as impairment that is not transitory and
minor.”132 Eshleman contended that the District Court neglected to address whether his
impairment that his employer perceived was transitory and minor. On appeal, the Third Circuit
discussed how to decide whom had the burden of proof, how to analyze transitory and minor,
and how to evaluate minor.
2.

Third Circuit’s Reasoning about Burden of Proof

Even though the Third Circuit cited to the Code of Federal Regulations and insinuated the
transitory and minor exception was a defense133 , it stated that the phrase “affirmative defense . . .
is imperfect shorthand.”134 The court stated the statutory texts required a regarded-as disability
claims to include a non-transitory or non-minor perceived impairment.135 Therefore, the court
held that even if the employer does not include a transitory and minor defense, the plaintiff
needed to allege a transitory and minor impairment to state a legally sufficient claim, giving the
plaintiff the burden of proof to show the impairment was neither transitory nor minor.136
3.

Third Circuit’s Reasoning about Transitory and Minor Analyses

On appeal, Eshleman contented that even though his injury was transitory, the District
Court needed to separately evaluate whether his impairment was minor. 137 The Third Circuit
agreed with Eshleman’s argument.138 The court noted the ADA’s definition of transitory, but it

131

Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., 961 F.3d 244, 244 (3rd Cir. 2020).
Id. at 247.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 246 n.25.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Eshleman, 961 F.3d at 247.
138 Id.
132
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then held, “The ADA does not, however, apply this definition to minor.”139 The court explained
that although the ADA is silent on the meaning of minor, “29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) states: ‘To
establish this defense, a covered entity must demonstrate that the impairment is both ‘transitory’
and ‘minor.’ Whether the impairment at issue is or would be ‘transitory and minor’ is to be
determined objectively.”140
The court further explained how the EEOC interpretations directly stated that the sixmonth time limit applied only to the “transitory” prong of the exception. 141 The EEOC
regulations also noted the transitory and minor exception requires a court find that “an
impairment is both transitory and minor, and the six-month limit applie[s] only to the ‘transitory’
prong.”142 The court quoted an example from the EEOC guidelines that discussed a “minor back
injury” that lasted more than six months.143 Even though the injury was minor, the impairment
was not transitory.144 This example showed that when an injury is only minor and not transitory,
it does not meet the exception.145 Therefore, the court held the opposite should also be true—
when an impairment is only transitory but is objectively not minor, it should be outside the
exception, as well.146 Ultimately, the court held “it was clear under the ADA regulations
‘transitory’ is just one prong of the ‘transitory and minor’ exception.” 147
Finally, the court also held its standard—excluding impairments only when they are both
transitory and minor—furthered Congress’s intent in expanding coverage through the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008.148 As the House Judiciary Committee Report on the ADAAA

139

Id.
Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 248.
143 Eshleman, 961 F.3d at 248.
144 See id.
145 Id. at 247.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 247.
140

18

explained, when including “regarded as” claims under the ADA “Congress did not expect or
intend that this would be a difficult standard to meet.”149 The Report further explained the
“transitory and minor” exception was intended to weed out only “claims at the lowest end of the
spectrum of severity,” such as “common ailments like the cold or flu,” and the exception “should
be construed narrowly.”150 Treating transitory and minor as separate and distinct elements was
therefore consistent with the intent to afford broad coverage under the “regarded as” provision.151
Similar to the language and intent of the ADA and its implementing regulations, the Third
Circuit regarded “transitory” and “minor” as separate and distinct inquiries required to meet the
“transitory and minor,” unlike decisions of other circuit courts.152 The court also cited district
courts that followed similar reasoning.153
4.

Third Circuit’s Reasoning Why Budhun Is Distinguishable

The court distinguished an earlier case discussing the “transitory and minor” exception.154
In Budhun, the plaintiff had a broken bone in her hand and no other issues, while in Eshleman’s
case he was perceived to have serious ongoing heart issues.155 The Eshleman court conceded
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that Budhun could be read to suggest that any impairments that last or are expected to last at least
six months are “transitory and minor,” but such an interpretation was at most dicta since the
injury was objectively non-serious.156 Budhun should not be “interpreted as imposing a rigid sixmonth-or-more requirement on establishing ‘regarded as’ claims.”157
5.

Third Circuit’s Reasoning for How to Evaluate Minor

The Third Circuit gave some insight on how to evaluate the term “minor,” but did not
give an exact standard for how to define it. The court explained that, because “minor” is not
defined in the statute, courts should approach the issue on a case-by-case basis.158 Further, the
court held the district court should have considered a variety of factors, including “the symptoms
and severity of the impairment, the type of treatment required, the risk involved, and whether any
kind of surgical intervention was anticipated or necessary—as well as the nature and scope of
any post-operative care.”159 Eshleman again distinguished Budhun by using these factors listed
above in its analysis. The court compared a broken pinky (the injury in Budhun) with a surgical
procedure to remove a lung nodule (the injury in Eshleman), and described them as “hardly
comparable.”160 The risks and post-operative care involved for a surgery on a vital organ like a
lung, the court reasoned, were important consideration.161 The court viewed these factors as
crucial “even if the impairment has an anticipated recovery time of two months and is therefore
‘transitory.’”162
The Third Circuit stated that not all “one-time surgeries” are automatically minor, but
there is nuance to that statement.163 The severity of the disability does not depend upon how
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often there is surgical intervention.164 The court held that “[w]e do not need expert testimony to
appreciate that a very serious medical condition may nevertheless require only a single surgical
procedure. Organ transplants are, perhaps, the best example of this.” 165 Since the injury suffered
was potentially non-minor and successfully pled, the court reversed the motion to dismiss and
remanded the case back to the district court to analyze whether the injury was minor or not. 166
IV.

Why the Exception Should be an Affirmative Defense with Separate Analyses for
Transitory and Minor
Although the courts have discussed the transitory and minor exception in a variety of

ways, I recommend the exception should be (1) considered as an affirmative defense pled and
proven by the employer and (2) analyzed by the courts in a way that separates the analyses of
transitory and minor. This section will show why the plain readings of the statutes and
regulations in question support these recommendations.
A.

Affirmative Defenses
1.

Plain Language Reading of the ADA

While the circuit courts are divided over whom should be required to plead and prove the
“transitory and minor” exception, a direct reading of the ADAAA combined with legislative
intent show a need for the employer to bring the affirmative defense. In the ADA, Congress
stated an individual met the “regarded as” prong of disability if the individual “established that
he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to
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limit a major life activity.”167 In the next section, Congress described the transitory and minor
exception, but did not explicitly state which party has the burden of proof. 168
Congress’s silence on the exception confirmed the employer has the burden to bring the
defense. If Congress intended to require the plaintiff to show her impairment was transitory and
minor, it would have combined the two bullets together. Instead, it kept the transitory and minor
separated by an “and”, which made them separate from the individual’s burden to show they
have a “regarded as” disability.
Critics of this Comment’s recommended standard could make an argument the intent that
transitory and minor require separate analyses is overly ambiguous based on a strict reading of
the ADA, which states an impairment must be transitory and minor to be excluded from
coverage. While that may be plausible, the legislative intent given by the EEOC and Congress,
explained below, combined with the direct reading of the statute make it clear the exception
requires the employer to bring the burden of proof; therefore the transitory and minor exception
is an affirmative defense.
2.

Deference to the EEOC

Along with the strict reading of the statute, there is legislative intent that the transitory
and minor exception requires the employer to have the burden of proof, effectively making it an
affirmative defense. Under Title I of the ADA, Congress explicitly gave the EEOC rule-making
power.169 The Supreme Court gave deference to the EEOC’s power as long as it considered the
regulations reasonable.170 The Supreme Court discussed this power of a government agency like
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the EEOC in its widely cited opinion of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.171 In Chevron, the court stated when reviewing a government agency’s
construction of a statute it administers, it is confronted with two different questions. 172 The
Court explained:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.173
This comment contends that Chevron deference to the EEOC’s interpretation of the
transitory and minor exception would not be required. The first step of Chevron requires
Congress must have given direct guidance on the particular statutory provision in question; the
Eshleman court and others have logically held that, under the ADA, it is unambiguous that
“‘transitory’ is just one prong of the ‘transitory and minor’ exception.” 174 However, some courts
may interpret this guidance in the text of the ADA as ambiguous.175 If so, the Supreme Court
has held when Congress delegates authority to an administrative agency to make rules “carrying
the force of law,” the agency’s interpretation would qualify for Chevron deference.176 The
EEOC has explicitly provided that “to establish this defense, a covered entity must demonstrate
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that the impairment is both ‘transitory’ and ‘minor.’”177 The EEOC’s guidance requires an
employer to bring the affirmative defense of transitory and minor, and gives the employer the
burden of proof to show why the injury meets the exception.
Thus, the plain language of the ADA is enough to prove the exception is an affirmative
defense that requires separate analyses for transitory and minor. However, if it is considered to
be too ambiguous, the EEOC’s interpretation of the affirmative defense is a reasonable one and
should be given deference by the courts.
B.

Why Courts Should Analyze “Transitory and Minor” Separately
The direct text of the ADA reads that the “regarded as” prong of disability “shall not

apply to impairments that are transitory and minor.”178 Since Congress used the word “and,”
normal rules of English grammar dictate both prongs must be met.179 Proponents of this theory
have stated that if Congress had wanted the standard to be one or the other, Congress would have
used the word “or” instead of “and.”180 Since Congress defined a transitory impairment as “an
impairment with an actual or expected duration of six months or less,” 181 but did not define
minor, it arguably made them fully separate terms, requiring separate analyses.
The EEOC regulations also confirm the hypothesis that transitory and minor should be
interpreted separately. In its guidance regarding the transitory and minor exception, the EEOC
gives examples of how the courts should interpret the exception. 182 Most crucially, the EEOC
states if an injury is minor but it lasts more than six months, it would not meet the exception. 183
Based on this reasoning, an injury would need to be separately discussed to see if it is transitory
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(lasting less than six months) and then if it is minor. The court in Eshleman correctly applied
this standard when citing the EEOC regulations and congressional reports.184 Other circuit
courts should follow this precedent of analyzing transitory and minor separately when
determining if the exception to “regarded as” disabilities is met.
V.

Defining a Minor Impairment

This section will give a background on the word “minor.” First, it will go over how the
dictionary defines minor. Then, it will describe how medical professionals define minor injuries,
show how the EEOC has used minor in the past, and recommend defining minor using a
commonsense approach that makes sure that “minor” is construed as narrowly as possible and as
close as possible to the medical definition.
A.

Dictionary Definition of Minor
Minor is a word with a multitude of meanings, and, without further context, a minor

impairment could confuse a reader. In the Merriam-Webster dictionary, there are three separate
entries for the word “minor.”185 In the context of this paper, however, minor is defined as
“inferior in importance, size, or degree: comparatively unimportant” or “not serious or involving
risk to life.”186 The Black’s Law Dictionary does not specifically define minor in the context of
a minor impairment, but it does define a minor fact as “the term given to an unimportant finding,
fact or the circumstances of a case.”187 This definition may give some context for how a minor
injury could be defined, as it should only be added to an impairment that is so very unimportant
or inferior.
B.

Medical Definitions of Minor Injuries
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In medical journals, there are multiple studies on minor injuries and how they are
defined. Overall, the journals agree minor injuries in the medical setting are often impairments
that send someone to urgent care centers or potentially the emergency room. 188 Minor injuries
are often classified in diagnoses as “fractures/dislocations, sprains/strains,
wounds/burns/infections, minor head injuries, eye/ear/nose/oral injuries.” 189 Exclusions to that
rule include “triage category 1 or 2, major trauma, critical care admission, or injuries and
fractures to the hip or neck or femur.”190 Some other examples of minor injuries are “animal
bites, broken or fractured bones, burns, cuts and lacerations, injuries from car accidents, injuries
from falls, injuries from sports or outdoor activities, muscle sprain or strain (especially ankles,
knees and shoulder).”191 Recovery from many of these injuries only last a few days or weeks,
but timing of the injury is not the only factor in deciding whether an injury is minor.192
C.

EEOC Definition of Minor in Other Contexts
The EEOC has not explicitly defined “minor,” but it has referenced the term when

describing the opposite of a substantial impairment. 193 Since there have been no definitions that
affect the transitory and minor exception, research on minor will need to extend past the EEOC’s
definition.
D.

Recommendation for Defining Minor Under the ADAAA
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Congress’s intent was to make “transitory and minor” a narrow exception, 194 so therefore
the definition of minor must also be construed narrowly. Reports from the Committee of
Education & Labor say the exception was intended to block only claims “lying at the lowest end
of the spectrum of severity” like colds and flus. Therefore, the standard should keep as close to
that as possible. The question for jurors when considering “minor” should be: Would a
reasonable person would consider the injury or impairment minor?
When pondering a reasonable definition of minor, medical definitions should be
considered. The definition should be reasonably based on the injuries that send people to urgent
care and to their doctor’s offices, and on the colds and flus that Congress sought to keep as the
minimum for a minor impairment. Procedures like the lap band surgery in Lyons or the heart
surgeries in Silk and Eshleman are more serious than minor injuries, like the broken finger in
Budhun.195 A reasonable jury would find there is a distinction between these two classes of
injuries. While time is a factor in determining if an injury is minor, it is not the only factor
considered in defining a minor impairment. The consequences of not analyzing the standard
carefully could potentially lead to serious orthopedic injuries, appendicitis, and even ministrokes being considered transitory and minor, which would not be in line with congressional
intent.196 The jury should be allowed the opportunity to decide whether it would reasonably
believe the impairment is minor, rather than just having to go by the length of time of the
impairment.
VI.

Conclusion
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The goal of the ADA and the later ADAAA was to be construed broadly to offer
protection for individuals with qualified disabilities. In order to follow the goal of the ADA and
the ADAAA to broadly provide protection for individuals with qualified disabilities, the
transitory and minor exception to “regarded as” disabilities must be construed narrowly. To do
so, the exception must be brought as an affirmative defense by the employer, who will then have
the burden of proof. As well, transitory and minor should be analyzed separately, and courts
should follow the lead of the Third Circuit in Eshleman in that regard. The word minor should
also be analyzed using a commonsense standard, keeping in mind that Congress only wanted to
protect against claim for disability for those with colds or the flu.197 To protect employees that
have serious recurring seizures like the employee in Randall and the teacher that was recovering
from lap band surgery in Lyons, more stringent standards for courts to follow when discussing
the transitory and minor exception should keep these employees from being discriminated
against and treated unfairly due to their short-term impairments.198 To achieve this, the courts
should require employers to prove impairments are transitory and minor, both terms should be
analyzed separately, and the term minor should be construed narrowly.

197

See H.R. Rep. No. 110–730 pt. 2, at 13 (2008).
See Randall v. United Petroleum Transports, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 566 (W. D. La. 2015); Silk, 795 F.3d at 698;
Lyons, 964 F.3d at 298.
198

28

